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The Right to Seek Asylum in Canada (During a Global Pandemic) 
Abstract 
This article analyzes the effect that the Canadian Government’s use of emergency powers during the 
COVID-19 global pandemic has had on the right to seek asylum in Canada. The article suggests that that 
the federal government has taken advantage of a public health crisis to make a contentious political 
problem—the entry of asylum seekers between land ports of entry (such as at Roxham Road)—go away. It 
details how the Quarantine Act and various Orders in Council have been used to temporarily extend the 
Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States (STCA) across the entire length of 
the Canada-US border. It then details how this de facto extension of the STCA, which previously applied 
only at official land ports of entry, violates international refugee law and overviews several ways in which 
the global pandemic has made the United States even less “safe” for refugees. The article concludes by 
urging the federal government to champion asylum seekers’ rights by suspending the STCA and by 
recognizing that crossing the border to seek asylum is amongst the most “essential” forms of 
international travel that there is. 
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IS CROSSING A BORDER to seek refugee protection “essential travel”? To refugee 
advocates, it is obvious that feeing human rights abuses is “essential.” Te 
Canadian government, however, appears to disagree. Soon after the COVID-19 
virus was declared a “global pandemic”1 they deemed the travel of truck drivers, 
agricultural workers, and returning snowbirds as essential,2 but not that of 
asylum seekers.3 
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced the use of executive powers 
under the Quarantine Act to turn away refugee claimants attempting to enter 
1. World Health Organization, “Statement on the second meeting of the International Health 
Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee regarding the outbreak of novel coronavirus 
(2019-nCoV)” (30 January 2020), online: <www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-
statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency 
-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov)> [perma.cc/ 
HQR4-8SP6]; Jamie Ducharme, “World Health Organization Declares COVID-19 a 
‘Pandemic.’ Here’s What Tat Means,” Time Magazine (11 March 2020), online: <time. 
com/5791661/who-coronavirus-pandemic-declaration> [perma.cc/JJ8S-GEX7]. 
2. Canada, Minimizing the Risk of Exposure to COVID-19 in Canada Order (Prohibition of Entry 
into Canada from the United States), (Order in Council), PC 2020-0161 (20 March 2020), 
s 3, online: <orders-in-council.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=38958&lang=en> [perma. 
cc/TA85-9LL4] [OIC, 2020-0161]; Public Safety Canada, “Guidance on Essential Services 
and Functions in Canada During the COVID-19 Pandemic” (9 April 2020), online: <www. 
publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/crtcl-nfrstrctr/esf-sfe-en.aspx> [perma.cc/BG4R-39HA]. 
3. Canada, Minimizing the Risk of Exposure to COVID-19 in Canada Order (Prohibition of Entry 
into Canada from the United States), (Order in Council), PC 2020-0263 (20 April 2020), 
s 5, online: <orders-in-council.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=39170&lang=en> [perma. 
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the country from the United States in late March 2020.4 Te Order in Council 
implementing these changes indicated that there were “no reasonable alternatives 
to prevent the introduction or spread of” COVID-19 in Canada.5 Although some 
restrictions were lifted in late April, most asylum seekers continue to be barred 
from entering the country.6 Refugee advocates have called this policy “arbitrary 
and unjustifable.”7 We agree. 
Te government has given no timeline for lifting these measures. It is not clear 
what alternative measures were considered. Nor has the government explained 
why it did not implement measures recommended by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to respect asylum seekers’ rights while 
protecting public health. Tese recommendations included, amongst others, 
either “continu[ing] asylum procedures in order to prevent backlogs” and 
implementing a series of adaptations to prevent COVID-19 transmission and 
ensure procedural fairness (such as using additional or alternative facilities with 
sufcient spacing or adopting remote interviewing modalities as alternatives to 
face-to-face interviewing) or implementing “an explicit exemption for asylum 
seekers” where “entry bans or border closures are implemented,” combined with 
medical screenings and quarantine.8 
Te use of executive powers to make sweeping changes to refugee admission 
policies, without public consultation and parliamentary debate, is troubling and 
unprecedented. Tese changes are particularly disturbing given the concerns 
raised in recent litigation about the Safe Tird Country Agreement (STCA), which 
is an international agreement between Canada and the United States. Te STCA
permits Canada to turn some asylum seekers back at the Canada–US border 
4. Kathleen Harris, “Canada to turn back asylum seekers, close border at midnight to stop 
spread of COVID-19” CBC News (20 March 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ 
trudeau-covid19-coronavirus-medical-equipment-1.5504149> [perma.cc/4YBY-EUDZ]. 
5. Canada, Minimizing the Risk of Exposure to COVID-19 in Canada Order (Prohibition of 
Entry into Canada from the United States), (Order in Council), PC 2020-0185 (26 March 
2020), para d, s 5(1), online: <orders-in-council.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=38991& 
lang=en> [perma.cc/GU4T-6U3J] [OIC, 2020-0185]. 
6. OIC, 2020-0263, supra note 3. 
7. Ravi Jain, “Re: COVID-19 and Irregular Asylum Seekers” (15 May 2020) at 2, online (pdf ): 
Canadian Bar Association <cba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=79ac3210-5ee7-425c-
8ac9-81bcac4acc9f> [perma.cc/9HJG-8X8V]. 
8. UNHCR Bureau for Europe, “Practical Recommendations and Good Practice to Address 
Concerns in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic” (9 April 2020) at 2, 8, online 
(pdf ): <data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/75453> [perma.cc/DT5M-85BK] 
[UNHCR Europe]. 










because it has designated the US as a “safe” country for refugees.9 Te litigation, 
which questioned the agreement’s constitutionality and whether the US is, 
in fact, “safe” for refugees, was successful (as discussed in more detail below).10 
Te Federal Court recently concluded that the STCA violates section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter), though the efect of this 
decision has been suspended for six months, and the federal government has 
announced its intention to appeal this decision.11 
Tis article begins by introducing the STCA and several of the controversies 
which surround it. It will then detail how emergency powers were used to achieve 
a de facto extension12 of the STCA across the entire land border, extending the 
STCA’s application beyond the ports of entry where it previously applied. Te 
article then discusses the surprising lack of consideration given to asylum seekers’ 
rights by the drafters of the Quarantine Act, the inconsistent rationales advanced 
by the federal government for the de facto STCA extension, and how these policies 
violate international law. Te article concludes that the de facto STCA extension 
was not the only option available to the government to prevent the spread of 
COVID-19. A better option would be to accept the Federal Court’s declaration 
that the STCA is unconstitutional, to suspend the agreement immediately, and to 
allow those seeking refugee protection to cross the border subject to the regular 
rules for travellers, including mandatory quarantines, by revoking the provisions 
relating to refugees in the orders in council used to close the border. Such an 
approach would acknowledge mounting evidence that the US is not a safe 
country for refugees and would protect public health without violating Canada’s 
legal obligations to asylum seekers. 
9. Please see Part I, below, for a detailed discussion of the STCA’s history and functioning. 
10. See Part I(B), below. 
11. Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FC 
770 at para 162 [CCR v Canada 2020]; Public Safety Canada, “Government of Canada to 
appeal the Federal Court decision on the Safe Tird Country Agreement” (21 August 2020), 
online: <www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2020/08/government-of-canada-
to-appeal-the-federal-court-decision-on-the-safe-third-country-agreement.html> [perma. 
cc/6TX3-NPK5] [Public Safety Canada, “Government of Canada to appeal”]. 
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I. THE SAFE THIRD COUNTRY AGREEMENT 
A. BACKGROUND 
Te Refugee Convention requires signatories to protect individuals who arrive at 
their borders and meet the refugee defnition.13 Regardless of how refugees travel 
to the country, as a signatory, Canada cannot deport them to a country where 
they will face persecution (doing so is known as “refoulement”).14 
Safe Tird Country Agreements (STCAs) allow states to return asylum 
seekers to countries which they have designated as “safe” instead of ofering 
them protection (prompting some scholars to refer to STCAs as “loophole[s] 
in international refugee law”).15 Te animating principle behind STCAs is that 
refugees should seek protection in the frst “safe” country that they reach outside 
of their country of origin: A “safe” country being one that respects prohibitions 
against refoulement in the Refugee Convention and in the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT).16 
Te possibility of an STCA with the US frst gained prominence in Canada 
in 1988, when Prime Minister Brian Mulroney introduced regulations intended 
to make it more difcult for refugees “to enter Canada in the frst place.”17 Tese 
reforms were criticized at that time as a plan to get the US “to do our dirty work 
and send the refugees back home.”18 
13. UNHCR, Note on International Protection, 44th session, UN Doc A/AC.96/815, August 
1993 at para 11. 
14. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Final Act of the United Nations Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 2545, 
arts 31, 33, as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 
150 [Refugee Convention]. 
15. Audrey Macklin, “Citizenship, Non-Citizenship and the Rule of Law” (2018) 69 UNBLJ 19 
at 38 [Macklin, 2018]. See also Isaac A Binkovitz, “State Practice with Respect to the Safe 
Tird Country Concept: Criteria for Determining Tat a State Ofers Efective Protection 
for Asylum Seekers and Refugees” (2018) 50 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 581. 
16. Refugee Convention, supra note 14, art 33; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, art 
3 (entered into force 26 June 1987); Audrey Macklin, “Disappearing Refugees: Refections 
on the Canada-U.S. Safe Tird Country Agreement” (2005) 36 Colum HRLR 365 at 381 
[Macklin, 2005]. 
17. Ninette Kelley & MJ Trebilcock, Te Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian 
Immigration Policy, 2nd ed (University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 418. 
18. Ibid at 419, 422. 












Although early eforts to secure an STCA with the US failed, it remained 
a priority for subsequent governments.19 Prime Minister Jean Chrétien fnally 
convinced the US to commit to working towards the agreement at the end of 
2001 in exchange for increased cooperation on border security.20 Tis was viewed 
by many as taking advantage of American security preoccupations in the wake of 
the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks.21 Te agreement was signed in 2002,22 the 
US was ofcially designated as a safe third country in October of 2004, and the 
agreement went into force on 29 December 2004.23 
Te STCA requires asylum seekers from other countries to make their refugee 
claim in the frst of the two countries that they arrive.24 Accordingly, if an asylum 
seeker frst passes through the US en route to Canada, when they arrive at a 
Canadian land port of entry (POE), they will be returned to the US to make their 
refugee claim. Tere are, however, a number of exceptions built into the STCA: 
asylum seekers who have a close family member living in Canada with lawful 
status, who are unaccompanied minors, or who arrived with a valid Canadian 
visa or entry document or were not required to obtain one may make claims 
in Canada.25 We will refer to these asylum seekers as “STCA exempt asylum 
seekers” going forward. 
Te STCA’s coming into force led to a “dramatic drop” in the number of 
refugee claims made in Canada, including several thousand fewer claims made 
19. Cara D Cutler, “Te U.S.-Canada Safe Tird Country Agreement: Slamming the Door on 
Refugees” (2004) 11 ILSA J Intl & Comp L 121 at 124. 
20. Howard Adelman, “Canadian Borders and Immigration Post 9/11” (2002) 36 Intl 
Migration Rev 15 at 27. 
21. Catherine Dauvergne, “Evaluating Canada’s New Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
in its Global Context” (2003) 41 Alta L Rev 725 at 738; Reg Whitaker, “Refugee Policy 
after September 11: Not Much New” (2002) 20 Refuge 29 at 32; Macklin, 2005, supra
note 16 at 371. 
22. Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of 
America For cooperation in the examination of refugee status claims from nationals of third 
countries, United States and Canada, 5 December 2002, Can TS 2004 No 2 (entered into 
force 29 December 2004) [STCA]. 
23. Macklin, 2005, supra note 16 at 370, 376. 
24. STCA, supra note 22 at arts 1(1)(a), 4(1). 
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at Canadian POEs.26 However, these numbers “only tell part of the story.”27 Te 
decrease in overall numbers was accompanied by an increase in border crossings 
between POEs28 after 2004,29 as many scholars anticipated.30 Because many 
asylum seekers could no longer “simply present themselves” at designated POEs 
to claim refugee protection “in an orderly, efcient, and safe manner,”31 they 
were forced to rely on the STCA’s limited applicability to refugee claims made at 
POEs.32 Te STCA allows Canada and the US to return asylum seekers to their 
“country of last presence,” defned as the country “in which the refugee claimant 
was physically present immediately prior to making a refugee status claim at a 
land border port of entry.”33 Accordingly, when an asylum seeker crosses from the 
US to Canada between POEs, “Canada is her country of last presence under the 
STCA,” and she may advance an inland claim for refugee protection.34 
While some refer to the non-application of the STCA between POEs as a 
“loophole,” it is better understood as an intentional feature of the agreement, 
26. Canadian Council for Refugees, “Closing the Front Door on Refugees: Report on the 
First Year of the Safe Tird Country Agreement” (December 2005) at 3-5, online (pdf ): 
<ccrweb.ca/en/closing-front-door-refugees-report-frst-year-safe-third-country-agreement> 
[perma.cc/Q47L-B975]. 
27. For further discussion, see Efrat Arbel, “Shifting Borders and the Boundaries of Rights: 
Examining the Safe Tird County Agreement between Canada and the United States” (2013) 
25 Intl J Refugee L 65 at 71-73. 
28. Crossing into Canada “between POEs” refers to crossing into Canada from the United 
States by land at any place other than those entry points which have been designated as 
POEs by the Canadian government. Whereas previously POEs were listed in a schedule to 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR), due to recent changes, discussed 
below, a POE is now simply defned as “a place designated by the Minister” of Public 
Safety and Emergency Preparedness. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, 
SOR/2016-37, s 2; Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2020-55, 
s 2 [IRPR].       
29. For a detailed discussion of how the STCA made the border “more dangerous and disorderly,” 
see Efrat Arbel & Alletta Brenner, “Bordering on Failure: Canada-U.S. Border Policy and the 
Politics of Refugee Exclusion” (Harvard Immigration and Refugee Law Clinical Program, 
November 2013) at 98-102. 
30. Emily Carasco, “Canada-United States Safe Tird Country Agreement: To What Purpose” 
(2003) 41 Can YB Intl Law 305 at 339; Macklin, 2005, supra note 16 at 398. 
31. Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 38. 
32. STCA, supra note 22, arts 1(1)(a), 4(1). 
33. Ibid, art 1(1)(a). 
34. Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 37. 
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or as a “safety valve.”35 Te Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (IRPR) 
explicitly state that the provisions in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
(IRPA) which prevent claimants arriving from the US from making refugee 
claims36 do “not apply to a claimant who seeks to enter Canada at a location that 
is not a port of entry.”37 Tis aspect of the STCA was discussed “at some length” 
by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration 
(the 2002 Standing Committee) prior to the STCA’s implementation.38 Te 
Committee specifcally recommended against extending the agreement across the 
entire land border based on evidence that Germany’s STCAs had “[led] people 
to enter the country surreptitiously.”39 Te Committee feared that if the STCA
applied across the entire land border it would “have an adverse efect on security 
and public health in Canada.”40 Ultimately, the Committee recommended that 
the government “suspend or terminate” the STCA if “an increase in the number 
of illegal entries to Canada” became apparent.41 
Although for many years crossings between POEs were not a major political 
issue in Canada,42 that changed with a “surge in asylum flings” in 2017.43 Tat 
35. For this reason, in this article we will not refer to the government’s recent actions which 
efectively extend the STCA’s application across the entire land border as closing a “loophole” 
but, instead, as “the de facto STCA extension.” See ibid at 35-38; Craig Damian Smith, 
“Changing U.S. Policy and Safe-Tird Country ‘Loophole’ Drive Irregular Migration to 
Canada” (16 October 2019), online: Migration Policy Institute <www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
article/us-policy-safe-third-country-loophole-drive-irregular-migration-canada> [perma. 
cc/RW4M-XGUC].  
36. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 101(1)(e) [IRPA]. 
37. IRPR, supra note 28, s 159.4(1)(a). See also Statutory Instruments 2004 138/22, (2004) C 
Gaz II, 1624, online (pdf ): Government of Canada <publications.gc.ca/gazette/archives/ 
p2/2004/2004-11-03/pdf/g2-13822.pdf> [perma.cc/ZQ6H-KFMS]. 
38. Canada, Standing Committee on Immigration and Citizenship, Te Safe Tird Country 
Regulations: Report of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (Standing 
Committee on Immigration and Citizenship, 2002) (Chair: Joe Fontana) at 10 [Standing 
Committee on Immigration and Citizenship, 2002]. 
39. Ibid. 
40. Ibid. 
41. Ibid; STCA, supra note 22, art 10(2)-(4). 
42. Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 41. 
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year, the RCMP intercepted 20,593 asylum seekers between ofcial POEs.44 Tis 
surge has been ascribed partly to policy changes making the US “less hospitable” 
for migrants following the election of Donald Trump in 2016,45 including: 
the “Muslim Travel Ban,”46 pushing back asylum seekers at the US–Mexico 
border,47 separating children and parents in detention,48 increasing immigration 
detention,49 and rendering many asylum seekers feeing gender-based persecution 
or gang violence ineligible for protection, amongst others.50 
It is important to note that the vast majority of these crossings between 
POEs were not clandestine. Most asylum seekers entering the country in this way 
“want[ed] to get caught,” and typically crossed the border openly at well-monitored 
locations between POEs, such as at Roxham Road.51 Upon entry, they indicated 
their intention to claim refugee protection and were allowed to do so as inland 
claimants.52 Tese entry points had essentially become unofcial POEs. Tey 
were considered well-managed due to standardized procedures, permanent 
44. Tese numbers decreased to 19,419 in 2018 and to 16,503 in 2019. As of 31 August 
2020, 3,143 migrants are reported as having been intercepted by the RCMP in 2020. 
See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Asylum claims by year” (18 August 
2020), online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/ 
asylum-claims.html> [perma.cc/2TSK-Q3T8] [IRCC, Asylum claims by year]. See also 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Irregular border crosser statistics” (22 May 
2020), online: <www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/statistics/Pages/Irregular-border-crosser-statistics.aspx> 
[perma.cc/EJ44-DTZX]. 
45. Smith, supra note 35. 
46. See generally Ryan M Mardini, “Te Muslim Ban and the Constitutional Crisis” (2019) 96 
U Det Mercy L Rev 225. 
47. See generally Amnesty International, “USA: ’You Don’t Have Any Rights Here’” (2018), 
online (pdf ): <www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR5191012018ENGLISH.PDF> 
[perma.cc/78FM-W95J]. 
48. UN News, “UN rights chief slams ‘unconscionable’ US border policy of separating migrant 
children from parents” (18 June 2018), online: <news.un.org/en/story/2018/06/1012382> 
[perma.cc/EC68-HJ48]. 
49. Donald J Trump, “Executive Order 13767: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement 
Improvements” (25 January 2017), s 11(d), online: <www.whitehouse.gov/presidential- 
actions/executive-order-border-security-immigration-enforcement-improvements> 
[perma.cc/R3AB-EZWG]. 
50. See generally Caroline Holliday, “Making Domestic Violence Private Again: Referral 
Authority and Rights Rollback in Matter of A-B-” (2019) 60 Boston College L Rev 2145. 
51. Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 29, 41. 
52. Ibid at 46. 















infrastructure, and “routinized security screening and frst-line admissibility 
checks” by the RCMP and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).53 
Te STCA is controversial for many reasons, but we will focus on two 
questions that have been particularly contentious in recent years. First, whether 
the US can be considered a safe country for refugees. Second, how to address the 
rise of entries between POEs. 
B. IS THE US SAFE FOR REFUGEES? 
Te Canadian Governor-in-Council’s (GIC) designation of the US as a “safe third 
country” has been contested for years.54 In 2007, the Federal Court concluded 
that the US was not safe for refugees, and that returning asylum seekers to the 
US unjustifably breached sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by exposing them to 
a risk of persecution or torture.55 However, the decision was overturned by the 
Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) for procedural reasons, including that the parties 
in the litigation lacked standing.56 
Following President Trump’s election, new litigation regarding the STCA
was launched, with litigants carefully chosen to avoid the procedural problems 
encountered previously.57 Te parties included refugee claimants who were 
ineligible to seek asylum in Canada because of the STCA: a Salvadoran woman 
and her children who were previously detained in the US and who sought asylum 
on the basis of gang and gender-based persecution, a Syrian family who left the 
US when the Muslim Travel Ban was issued by the US government, and an 
Ethiopian woman who was held in detention in the US for a month after she was 
denied entry to Canada.58 
53. It is important to note that despite RCMP and CBSA presence, entering Canada at Roxham 
Road qualifes as entering Canada “between POEs.” Although Roxham Road was “the site of 
a former designated port of entry that closed several years ago,” it has not been re-designated 
as a POE since. Te Canadian government has refrained from designating these sites as 
POEs, presumably because doing so would simply lead asylum seekers to cross at less 
well-monitored locations. Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 29, 41; Smith, supra note 35. 
54. IRPA, supra note 36, s 102(1). 
55. Canadian Council for Refugees v R, 2007 FC 1262 at paras 51, 240, 338. 
56. Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada, 2008 FCA 229 at paras 98-103, leave to appeal to 
SCC refused, 32820 (5 February 2009). For a detailed discussion of this litigation, see Arbel, 
supra note 27 at 78-84. 
57. For a discussion of these problems, see ibid at 81-84; Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 40-41; 
Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada, 2018 FC 829 at para 5. 
58. Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FC 
770 (CanLII) (Applicant’s Further Memorandum of Fact and Law, paras 37-43) (on fle 






















MERCIER, REHAAG, THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM 715 
Te applicants challenged the provisions of the IRPA which designated the 
US as a safe third country59 and which render claimants travelling from the US 
ineligible to have their refugee claims considered in Canada on several grounds.60 
Teir arguments focused on multiple “aspects of the U.S. asylum system that limit 
the protection accessible to broad classes of refugees, exposing them to refoulement
in violation of the Refugee Convention.”61 Tey provided extensive evidence on 
these aspects of the US refugee system, including on a policy called the “one year 
bar” which imposes a higher risk standard than does the Refugee Convention for 
claimants who do not make their claim within a year of arriving in the country,62 
on policies which efectively place women feeing gender-based-persecution 
“outside the refugee defnition,”63 on an “overly restrictive legal interpretation” 
of the particular social group ground of asylum which increases the risk of 
refoulement for “those feeing harm based on their sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or gang targeting,”64 on the practice of criminally prosecuting “illegal” 
entry into the US of asylum seekers,65 on the use of an “expedited removal process” 
which denies many asylum seekers an opportunity to claim asylum,66 and on a 
series of policies at the US–Mexico border which illegally pushes asylum seekers 
back and/or forces them to wait in Mexico “for months or years” until their US 
asylum hearing.67 Te applicants also provided extensive evidence on American 
immigration detention conditions, including evidence about “the large-scale 
detention of children and the mass separation of children and parents,”68 evidence 
that asylum seekers “regularly remain detained throughout the asylum process,”69 
evidence that being detained in this way “seriously impedes asylum-seekers’ 
ability to mount an asylum claim,”70 and evidence that detention conditions 
59. IRPR, supra note 28, s 159.3. 
60. IRPA, supra note 36, s 101(1)(e). Te applicants sought declarations that these provisions 
were ultra vires, inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under the Refugee Convention and 
the CAT and in violation of sections 7 and 15 of the Charter. CCR v Canada, 2020, supra
note 11 at para 28. 
61. CCR v Canada, Applicant’s Memo, supra note 58 at para 16. 
62. Ibid at paras 32-36. 
63. Ibid at para 37. 
64. Ibid at para 42. 
65. Ibid at para 44. 
66. Ibid at para 47. 
67. Ibid at paras 53-54. 
68. Ibid at para 26. 
69. Ibid at para 19. 
70. Ibid at para 22. 














were “often inhumane, cruel and unusual.”71 We note that, because the case was 
heard prior to the global pandemic, no evidence connected to COVID-19 was 
before the court. 
In July 2020, several months into the pandemic, the Federal Court released 
its decision in the Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada (CCR v Canada) 
case. In its decision, the court was careful not to “pass judgement on the US 
asylum system” or to engage in “a comparison” of Canadian and American 
asylum systems.72 Te court rejected a line of arguments that focused on the 
reasonableness of designating the US as a safe third country73 and declined to 
address a line of arguments focused on the STCA’s disproportionate impact on 
women.74 However, the court agreed with the applicants that the provisions 
implementing the STCA violated constitutional rights to life, liberty, and security 
of the person under section 7 of the Charter. Te court concluded these violations 
could not be justifed in a free and democratic society under section 1.75 
Te analysis in CCR v Canada was largely focused on the evidence with 
respect to US detention conditions outlined above. Te court concluded that 
“the immediate consequence to ineligible STCA claimants is that they will be 
imprisoned solely for having attempted to make a refugee claim in Canada.”76 
Te court’s analysis centred on the evidence of what befell one of the applicants, 
71. Te conditions described by the applicants included “punitive conditions; Solitary 
confnement; Inadequate and/or delayed medical care …; Staggering rates of sexual assault 
and sexual harassment; Dangerous overcrowding; Cold temperatures; Inadequate/unsafe 
food/water and lack of accommodation of religious dietary customs; Limited or no time 
outdoors.” Ibid at para 24. 
72. CCR v Canada, 2020, supra note 11 at para 138. 
73. Te applicants argued that the relevant provisions were ultra vires, or beyond the 
government’s lawful authority. Te court concluded that it could not depart from the 
“binding authority” of the Federal Court of Appeal’s (FCA) 2008 decision on this matter. 
While the Federal Court concluded in 2007 that the STCA’s failure to comply with relevant 
provisions of the Refugee Convention and the CAT was a condition precedent to the GIC’s 
exercise of its delegated authority under s 102 of the IRPA, the FCA found that it was 
“irrelevant” if the US “actually” complied with these conventions as long as the Canadian 
government considered the factors set out in s 102(2) of the IRPA. For a detailed discussion 
of these decisions, see Arbel, supra note 27 at 79-82. CCR v Canada, 2020, supra note 11 at 
paras 79-80.    
74. Te applicants also argued that the STCA violates s 15 of the Charter “because it has a 
disproportionate impact on women” due to US asylum law’s efective exclusion of asylum 
claims founded on gender-based persecution. Te court declined to address this challenge in 
light of its ruling with respect to section 7. For further discussion of the arguments advanced 
with respect to s 15, see Part III(D). See CCR v Canada, 2020, supra note 11 at para 154. 
75. Ibid at para 162. 
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Ms. Mustefa. After trying to claim asylum in Canada and being found ineligible 
because of the STCA, Ms. Mustefa was returned to the US by CBSA ofcers, was 
then “immediately imprisoned,” held in solitary confnement for a week, lost 
nearly ffteen pounds because she was being fed pork “despite telling the guards 
she could not consume it for religious reasons,” and was “detained alongside 
people who had criminal convictions.”77 Te court found that this evidence was 
sufcient to “shock the conscience,” that it “clearly demonstrate[d] that those 
returned to the US by Canadian ofcials are detained as a penalty” without 
“regard for their circumstances, moral blameworthiness, or their actions,” and 
that these actions were “not in keeping with the spirit or the intention of the 
STCA or the foundational  Conventions upon which it was built.”78 Te court 
concluded that the liberty rights in section 7 of the Charter were breached, that 
“Canada cannot turn a blind eye to the consequences that befell Ms. Mustefa 
in its eforts to adhere to the STCA,” and that “the risk of detention for the 
sake of  ‘administrative’  compliance with the provisions of the STCA cannot 
be justifed.”79 
Te court concluded by declaring the relevant provisions of the IRPA and the 
IRPR to be of no force and efect but suspended the efect of its decision for six 
months to “allow time for Parliament to respond.”80 
Te Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Bill Blair, has 
recently announced that the federal government intends to appeal this decision, 
citing unspecifed “factual and legal errors” in CCR v Canada and reiterating that 
“people should claim asylum in the frst safe country in which they arrive.”81 Tis 
issue will accordingly remain live for at least some time. We will further address 
several of the arguments considered in CCR v Canada below. 
C. HOW SHOULD THE “SURGE” IN ENTRIES BETWEEN POES BE 
ADDRESSED? 
In addition to questions about the constitutionality of the STCA, there has also been 
signifcant controversy about how to address the rise in asylum seekers supposedly 
“illegally” entering Canada using the so-called “loophole” in the STCA.82 
77. Ibid at paras 92-96. 
78. Ibid at paras 135-39. 
79. Ibid at paras 103-15. 
80. Ibid at paras 162-63. 
81. Public Safety Canada, “Government of Canada to appeal,” supra note 11. 
82. For a discussion of why it is inaccurate to call entering between POEs a “loophole,” see notes 
35 to 41 and accompanying text. 















Before examining that controversy, we wish to highlight that it is not 
“illegal” for asylum seekers to enter Canada between ofcial POEs. International 
law recognizes the right to seek asylum,83 and the Refugee Convention prohibits 
signatories from imposing “penalties” on refugees who have entered “without 
authorization.”84 Until recently, the only technically “illegal” act that an asylum 
seeker made when crossing the border between ofcial POEs was their failure to 
declare imported goods.85 
In response to the 2017 “surge” described above, many have called for the 
STCA’s suspension.86 Some have specifcally questioned why the government did 
not “heed the recommendation” of the 2002 Standing Committee to suspend 
the agreement once “an increase in the number of illegal entries to Canada” had 
become apparent.87 
At the same time, members of the Conservative Party objecting to “illegal 
border crossers” from the US88 have sought to declare the entire land border 
with the US a POE, thus unilaterally expanding the STCA.89 It is difcult to 
understand how this could have been implemented. While either country may 
terminate or suspend the STCA unilaterally, any modifcations or additions 
must be agreed to in writing.90 Without the US’s consent to return these asylum 
seekers, the US could—and likely would—simply refuse to re-admit them. 
83. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 
13, UN Doc A/810 (1948) 71, art 14. For further discussion, see Jane McAdam & Kate 
Purcell, “Refugee Protection in the Howard Years: Obstructing the Right to Seek Asylum” 
(2008) 27 Australian YB of Intl L 87 at 90-92. 
84. Refugee Convention, supra note 14, art 31. 
85. Changes to be discussed in detail in Part III(G), below. See Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 
at 31, 46-47.   
86. Te Canadian Press, “Quebec should have power over Ottawa in refugee settlement: 
Bloc Quebecois leader,” Global News (23 September 2019), online: <globalnews.ca/ 
news/5940238/bloc-quebecois-leader-calls-for-suspension-of-safe-third-country-agreement> 
[perma.cc/A3AR-LRAN]; Jenny Kwan, “NDP Statement on Safe Tird Country Agreement” 
(15 March 2019), online: NDP <www.ndp.ca/news/ndp-statement-safe-third-country-
agreement> [perma.cc/FP25-TAUR]. 
87. Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 43; Standing Committee on Immigration and Citizenship, 
2002, supra note 38 at 10. 
88. Conservative Party of Canada, “A new Conservative government will close the loophole 
in the Safe Tird Country Agreement” (9 October 2019), online: <www.conservative. 
ca/a-new-conservative-government-will-close-the-loophole-in-the-safe-third-country-
agreement> [perma.cc/QCP5-U36J]. 
89. Brian Hill, “Experts say Scheer’s plan to close border loophole ‘doomed to failure,’” Global 
News (9 October 2019), online: <globalnews.ca/news/6011333/scheer-plan-border-
loophoole-doomed-to-failure-experts> [perma.cc/UBB7-DBHR]. 
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Ultimately, the Liberal government chose to neither suspend nor unilaterally 
expand the STCA. Instead, the Prime Minister’s most recent mandate letter of 
the IRCC Minister included a commitment to “work with the United States 
to modernize” the STCA.91 Although the current IRCC Minister refused to 
confrm whether “modernize” meant “that the government is looking for ways 
to extend and expand” the STCA,92 and the former IRCC Minister indicated 
that there was “no need to tinker” with the STCA,93 it is clear that eforts have 
long been underway to “review” the agreement with the US.94 Indeed, Minister 
Blair has indicated that Canada was “hoping to address” the “exemption” in the 
STCA allowing people “to avoid its terms” in “ongoing discussions” with the 
US.95 However, little progress was made on this front.96 Tis is unsurprising. 
Te Trump administration has little interest in preventing asylum seekers from 
leaving the US for Canada. 
II.  THE DE FACTO EXTENSION OF THE STCA ACROSS THE 
ENTIRE LAND BORDER 
Despite American reluctance, the goal of negotiating away the STCA “exemption” 
has nonetheless been temporarily achieved during the COVID-19 crisis. Media 
reports suggest that the US has agreed to the de facto STCA extension during the 
91. Justin Trudeau, “Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Mandate Letter” 
(13 December 2019), online: Ofce of the Prime Minister <pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-letters/ 
2019/12/13/minister-immigration-refugees-and-citizenship-mandate-letter>. 
92. Te Minister answered that modernize “means to continually reassess this agreement.” House 
of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings 
and Evidence, 43-1, No 5 (12 March 2020) at 6, online: Our Commons <www.ourcommons. 
ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-1/CIMM/meeting-5/minutes> [perma.cc/F7TV-DPML]. 
93. Brenna Rose, “Safe Tird Country Agreement to stay, pledges immigration minister,” 
CBC News (29 March 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/ 
safe-third-country-agreement-to-stay-pledges-immigration-minister-1.4046998>. 
94. Rachel Aiello, “Border security minister engages U.S. in formal Safe Tird Country talks,” 
CTV News (23 September 2018), online: <www.ctvnews.ca/politics/border-security-minister-
engages-u-s-in-formal-safe-third-country-talks-1.4104602> [perma.cc/DEW7-TAPY]. 
95. Teresa Wright, “Blair mulling ways to close loophole in Safe Tird Country Agreement,” 
National Observer (17 March 2019), online: <www.nationalobserver.com/2019/03/17/news/ 
blair-mulling-ways-close-loophole-safe-third-country-agreement> [perma.cc/CX66-4F3H]. 
96. Amanda Connolly, “U.S. inches closer to allowing talks to amend Safe Tird Country 
Agreement,” Global News (1 April 2019), online <globalnews.ca/news/5119022/ 
safe-third-country-agreement-amend-united-states> [perma.cc/9VYY-RW4J]. 














global pandemic.97 Te extension will likely remain in efect until all appeals of 
CCR v Canada are concluded. 
Unfortunately, despite pressure from activists, the government has refused 
to make agreements or negotiations with the US on these matters public.98 Teir 
efects can nonetheless be tracked through a series of Orders in Council (OICs) 
released by the GIC pursuant to the Quarantine Act to prevent “non-essential” 
foreign nationals from entering Canada.99 
A. ORDERS IN COUNCIL AND ALTERED REGULATIONS 
Te frst OIC, issued on 20 March 2020, prohibited most foreign nationals from 
entering Canada from the US “for the purpose of making a claim for refugee 
protection,” both at and between POEs.100 Tis broad ban on asylum seekers’ 
entry continued through subsequent OICs.101 Ten, on 20 April 2020, the 
government once again permitted asylum seekers who met STCA exemptions 
to seek asylum at ofcial POEs, but introduced sweeping measures prohibiting 
most foreign nationals from entering Canada through the US “for the purpose 
of making a claim for refugee protection unless” they specifcally sought “to 
enter Canada at a land [POE] designated by the Minister of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness.”102 
Tis OIC activated three relevant sections of the IRPR which were amended 
a month earlier to authorize the CBSA “to operationalize the prohibitions” made 
in all subsequent OICs pursuant to the Quarantine Act or the Emergencies Act.103 
97. Brooklyn Neustaeter, “Canada-U.S. border to remain closed to non-essential travel for 
another month,” CTV News (16 June 2020), online: <www.ctvnews.ca/health/coronavirus/ 
canada-u-s-border-to-remain-closed-to-non-essential-travel-for-another-month-1.4986310>. 
98. Nicholas Keung, “Ottawa should reveal details of border ban,” Toronto Star (11 May 
2020), online: <www.thestar.com/news/gta/2020/05/11/ottawa-should-reveal-details-of-
border-ban-on-irregular-migrants-refugee-advocates-say.html> [perma.cc/YK33-KJMP] 
[Keung, “Border Ban”]. 
99. Quarantine Act, SC 2005, c 20, s 58 [Quarantine Act]. 
100. OIC, 2020-0161, supra note 2, s 4(1). 
101. OIC, 2020-0185, supra note 5, s 5(1). 
102. OIC, 2020-0263, supra note 3, s 5(1). Tese same measures have been replicated in 
subsequent orders, including the most recent OIC, efective until 21 September 2020. 
Canada, Minimizing the Risk of Exposure to COVID-19 in Canada Order (Prohibition of Entry 
into Canada from the United States), (Order in Council), PC 2020-0565 (20 August 2020), 
s 5(1), online: <orders-in-council.canada.ca/attachment.php?attach=39536&lang=en> 
[perma.cc/666U-9ZA4]. 
103. IRPR, supra note 28; Statutory Instruments 2020 154/8, (2020) C Gaz II, 554-55, online: 
Government of Canada <canadagazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2020/2020-04-15/pdf/g2-15408. 
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First, part of the defnition of a POE was repealed so that it was now simply 
defned as “a place designated by the Minister” as a POE.104 Secondly, the 
Minister was granted full discretion to designate POEs in response to new OICs 
issued pursuant to the Quarantine Act or the Emergencies Act.105 Finally, foreign 
nationals “prohibited from entering Canada by” one of these OICs were added to 
the list of those who CBSA ofcers could “direct back” to the US.106 
Previously, IRCC guidance indicated that CBSA ofcers could only 
temporarily direct refugee claimants back to the US “under exceptional 
circumstances” and only after making “[a]ll eforts” to process them at the 
time of arrival.107 In those circumstances, ofcers were required to schedule 
an appointment within three working days and to seek “assurances from” 
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that the claimant would be made 
available to return for their appointment.108 
Te changes to the direct back provisions signifcantly expand their potential 
use and application. According to a recent CBSA Operational Bulletin, all foreign 
nationals not falling under one of the prescribed exemptions to the OICs are to 
be directed back to the US “until the order is lifted.”109 Te Bulletin indicates that 
those who comply with the direct backs will be allowed to “return to the border 
to seek entry after the prohibitions have been lifted,”110 but that those who fail 
to comply or who attempt to re-enter before the OICs are lifted “after being 
directed back” will be rendered inadmissible to Canada for non-compliance 
with the IRPA.111 Asylum seekers entering the country between POEs appear to 
be caught by this policy;112 the bulletin specifcally mentions foreign nationals 
“intercepted between” POEs amongst those to be directed back to the US.113 
104. See discussion above at note 28. See also Canada Gazette, 2020, supra note 103 at 556. 
105. IRPR, supra note 28, s 26(f ). 
106. Ibid, s 41(d). 
107. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “ENF 4 Port of Entry Examinations” (15 
August 2019) at 98, online (pdf ): <www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/migration/ircc/english/ 
resources/manuals/enf/enf04-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/SV3S-RKNX]. 
108. Ibid at 99. 
109. Canada Border Services Agency, Regulatory Amendments to Implement Travel Prohibitions in 
Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic, (Operational Bulletin), OBO-2020-021 (21 March 2020) 
at 2 [CBSA, OBO-2020-021]. 
110. Ibid at 4. 
111. Ibid. 
112. Please note that we cannot speak defnitively—we are aware of a separate bulletin which 
apparently provides instructions for ofcers dealing with all “foreign nationals who make a 
claim for refugee protection.” Tis bulletin has not been made publicly available. We have 
made an Access to Information Request in hopes of obtaining it. Ibid at 3. 
113. Ibid at 4. 










Taken together, the three changes to the IRPR outlined above efectively 
ensure that designated POEs are the only places where asylum seekers may 
currently enter the country. Similarly, the relevant OICs ensure that only STCA
exempt asylum seekers will be admitted at designated POEs. Tis means that 
the STCA is currently being enforced in a manner that is even more restrictive 
than when the Federal Court heard evidence which led the court to declare the 
agreement unconstitutional. 
As discussed above, closing the Canada–US border to asylum seekers 
entering between POEs can only be achieved with the US’s consent. Although 
the terms of the current arrangements with the US are not publicly known, 
Canada has achieved its objective of ending border crossings between POEs, 
at least temporarily, by leveraging the COVID-19 crisis to surmount apparent 
US reluctance. Te result is that the Canadian government has efectively barred 
most refugee claimants from entering Canada.114 
It is worth noting the striking parallels between the present moment and the 
moment which initially motivated the US to sign the STCA. Just as the Canadian 
government took advantage of American preoccupations with national security 
after 9/11 to convince the US to agree to the STCA in 2001, today Canada has 
leveraged a global pandemic to persuade the US to (at least temporarily) agree to 
the de facto extension of the STCA.115 
Perhaps we should not be surprised. Pandemic planning has long invoked 
analogies “between contagious disease and terrorism; between the individual 
carrier of disease and the terrorist intent on destruction.”116 As Janet Mosher has 
observed, “[b]oth are depicted as threats to national security, and best managed 
through surveillance, borders, containment, and control.”117 
B. LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE QUARANTINE ACT 
Te use of the Quarantine Act to close the border to most refugees raises the 
question: do these actions align with the purposes of the Act? 
114. For details of how other refugees have been blocked from coming to Canada, including some 
resettled refugees, see Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Coronavirus disease 
(COVID-19): Refugees, asylum complaints, sponsors and PRRA applicants” (25 May 2020), 
online: <www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/coronavirus-covid19/ 
refugees.html#resettlement> [perma.cc/T3MF-79RW]. 
115. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text, above. See also Cutler, supra note 19 at 125. 
116. Janet E Mosher, “Accessing Justice amid Treats of Contagion” (2014) 51 Osgoode 
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Te power to prohibit classes of persons from entering Canada in response 
to public health risks was introduced following the 2003 SARS outbreak. Te 
Minister of Health introduced a revised Quarantine Act in 2005 empowering 
the GIC to prohibit “any class of persons” from entering Canada if “the entry of 
members of that class of persons” might “introduce or contribute to the spread 
of” a communicable disease and “no reasonable alternatives” were available to 
prevent such a spread.118 
Te drafters of the Act do not appear to have discussed the impact of such 
a closure on asylum seekers in committee or parliamentary debates. Te only 
mention of refugees in these discussions was an assertion about the need for 
“clarity around whether this Act will be paramount to” the IRPA.119 Tere appears 
to have been no consideration of what “reasonable alternatives to prevent the 
introduction or spread of the disease” needed to be considered before excluding 
a whole class of people from the country. 
However, the drafters did speak of wanting to strike the “proper balance 
between the need to protect public health and the need to protect human 
rights.”120 Tey took pains to ensure that those enforcing the Act would “always 
choose the least intrusive measure” available.121 We may therefore conclude that 
the drafters assumed that this “extreme measure” would only be implemented if 
it struck the proper balance between the human rights of those being excluded 
and the need to protect public health.122 In our view, the de facto STCA extension 
has not achieved this balance. 
118. Nola M Ries, “Quarantine and the Law: Te 2003 SARS Experience in Canada (A New 
Disease Calls on Old Public Health Tools)” (2005) 43 Alta L Rev 529 at 535; Quarantine 
Act, supra note 99, s 58. 
119. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Health, Evidence, 38-1, No 9 (23 November 
2004) 1 at 2, online (pdf ): OurCommons <www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/381/ 
HESA/Evidence/EV1498032/HESAEV09-E.PDF> [perma.cc/V6CS-U2UY]. 
120. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Health, Evidence, 38-1, No 6 (4 November 
2004) at 6, online (pdf ): OurCommons <www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/381/ 
HESA/Evidence/EV1460081/HESAEV06-E.PDF> [perma.cc/6KB3-SD7D]. 
121. Ibid at 6. 
122. Ries, supra note 118 at 535. 






   




C. IMPACT OF THE DE FACTO STCA EXTENSION TO DATE 
Between 21 March and 12 May 2020, twenty-six asylum seekers were directed 
back to the US after attempting to enter Canada between POEs.123 For context, 
the RCMP intercepted 1,246 asylum seekers in April of 2019, and 1,196 in May 
of 2019.124 Tese numbers indicate that either fewer asylum seekers are entering 
from the US during COVID-19, or, as the 2002 Standing Committee feared, 
that more asylum seekers are simply avoiding detection upon entry. 
Like many refugee advocates, we fear that Canada’s emergency measures may 
lead to the refoulement of asylum seekers, in violation of international law.125 
It remains unclear whether the US has committed not to deport returned asylum 
seekers, but some American ofcials have indicated that they “will immediately” 
deport “illegal aliens.”126 Further, as discussed briefy in Part I(B), above, the 
Federal Court confrmed in CCR v Canada that “the immediate consequence 
to ineligible STCA claimants” of being denied entry to Canada is “that they will 
be imprisoned solely for having attempted to make a refugee claim in Canada,” 
and that this detention takes place “without regard to their circumstances, moral 
blameworthiness, or their actions.”127 Te Federal Court also characterized 
detention conditions as “cruel and usual,” even without considering evidence of 
123. Daniel Renaud, “Le nombre de demandeurs d’asile en chute libre,” La Presse (13 May 2020), 
online: <www.lapresse.ca/covid-19/202005/12/01-5273336-le-nombre-de-demandeurs-
dasile-en-chute-libre.php> [perma.cc/ZP2B-QS23]. See also Stephanie Levitz, “CBSA says it 
turned back 21 asylum seekers who tried to cross from U.S. in May,” Te Globe and Mail (29 
June 2020), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-cbsa-says-it-turned-back-21-
asylum-seekers-who-tried-to-cross-from-us> [perma.cc/W88Y-HJNV]. 
124. IRCC, Asylum claims by year, supra note 44. 
125. Keung, “Border Ban,” supra note 98. 
126. Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: DHS Measures on the Border to Limit the 
Further Spread of Coronavirus” (23 March 2020), online: <www.dhs.gov/news/2020/05/20/ 
fact-sheet-dhs-measures-border-limit-further-spread-coronavirus> [perma.cc/MB7W-XZAF] 
[DHS]. See also Reuters, “Asylum-seekers turned back by Canada at its border will be 
shipped home, U.S. says,” National Post (27 March 2020), online: <nationalpost.com/news/ 
canada/u-s-to-return-canada-bound-asylum-seekers-stopped-at-border-to-home-nations> 
[perma.cc/PW46-BFP6]. 
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heightened risks during COVID-19.128 In our view, the American response to the 
pandemic has only amplifed the concerns that led the Federal Court to fnd the 
STCA unconstitutional. 
III. SOME OF THE BIGGEST PROBLEMS WITH THE DE 
FACTO EXTENSION OF THE STCA 
We acknowledge that responsible governments must “take legitimate measures 
to prevent the spread of the virus.”129 In a similar acknowledgment, the UNHCR 
issued two documents which provide guidance on how states can achieve “an 
efective response to the pandemic while at the same time respecting international 
refugee law and standards.”130 Te frst outlines “key legal considerations, based on 
international refugee and human rights law” which states should consider if they 
“restrict the entry of non-nationals for the protection of public health in response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic.”131 Te second, issued by the UNHCR’s Regional 
Bureau for Europe, provided governments with “a set of practical considerations 
and concrete advice to enable an efective response to the pandemic while at the 
same time respecting international refugee law and standards.”132 
In our view, the measures adopted by the Canadian government fail to respect 
the international standards refected in these documents in four key respects: (1) 
they appear to penalize asylum seekers for “illegal” entry; (2) they are not clearly 
“necessary for the legitimate purpose of managing the identifed health risk”;133 
(3) they do not provide any mechanism for making “independent inquiries” 
128. Ibid at para 136. See generally Amnesty International, “USA: ‘We are Adrift, About to 
Sink’: Te Looming COVID-19 Disaster in the United States Immigration Detention 
Facilities” (April 2020), online (pdf ): <www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ 
AMR5120952020english.pdf> [perma.cc/R3R6-9EJ7]; Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, “ICE Detainee Statistics” (5 June 2020), online: <www.ice.gov/coronavirus> 
[perma.cc/BZ4A-WK5E]; Patricia Sulbarán Lovera, “Coronavirus: Immigration detention 
centres in crisis,” BBC News (1 May 2020), online: <www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
52476131> [perma.cc/T55A-5J97]. 
129. UNHCR Europe, supra note 8 at 1. 
130. Ibid. 
131. UNHCR, “Key Legal Considerations on access to territory for persons in need of 
international protection in the context of the COVID-19 response” (16 March 2020) at 
para 5, online: <data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/75349> [perma.cc/BC7B-X2GH] 
[UNHCR, COVID-19]. 
132. UNHCR Europe, supra note 8 at 1. 
133. UNHCR, COVID-19, supra note 131 at para 7. 














to ensure that persons arriving at their borders “are not at risk of refoulement”;134 
and (4) they do not abide by the requirement that “measures to ascertain and 
manage risks to public health … must be non-discriminatory,”135 as they will 
likely amplify the STCA’s disproportionate impact on female asylum seekers, 
particularly those feeing gender-based persecution. 
A. DO THE MEASURES PENALIZE ASYLUM SEEKERS FOR THEIR METHOD 
OF ENTRY? 
Our frst concern with the de facto STCA extension is that it penalizes asylum 
seekers for entering the country irregularly. CBSA directives reveal that asylum 
seekers who enter the country between POEs may be charged by the RCMP 
with “non-compliance with the Quarantine Act prohibition on non-essential 
travel” (which carries a fne of up to $750,000 and/or imprisonment for up to six 
months), or may be directed back to the US by the CBSA.136 Tis is a dramatic 
departure from previous Canadian practice, where the only thing “illegal” about 
these crossings was a minor breach of the Customs Act.137 
Tese changes appear to contravene article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention, 
which prohibits state parties from “impos[ing] penalties, on account of their 
illegal entry or presence, on refugees who … enter or are present in their territory 
without authorization.”138 Tese prohibitions are refected in the IRPA: Section 
133 prevents refugees and refugee claimants from being charged for certain 
crimes “in relation to [their] coming into Canada.”139 However, these protections 
are limited to select ofences under the IRPA and the Criminal Code of Canada.140 
Te government’s failure to include the new Quarantine Act ofences under this 
provision’s protection means that asylum seekers could face fnes or imprisonment 
for coming into Canada to claim refugee protection. 
Even if asylum seekers are not charged, directing them back to the US for 
breaching the Quarantine Act is itself a penalty. Te Supreme Court of Canada 
134. Ibid at para 3. 
135. Ibid at para 5. 
136. CBSA, OBO-2020-021, supra note 109 at 2, 4-5; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “News 
Release: RCMP role in enforcing the Federal Quarantine Act” (10 April 2020), online: 
<www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/news/2020/rcmp-role-enforcing-the-federal-quarantine-act> 
[perma.cc/ZK96-4494]; Quarantine Act, supra note 99, s 71. 
137. See Macklin, 2018, supra note 15 at 46-48. 
138. Refugee Convention, supra note 14, art 31(1). 
139. Uppal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 338 at para 21. 
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has confrmed that article 31 does not apply “only to criminal  penalties.”141 
International refugee law expert James Hathaway has described a US practice 
of placing some asylum seekers who arrive irregularly into expedited removal 
processes with reduced procedural rights as “a penalty inficted for irregular 
entry” because the procedure is designed “to sanction a refugee for his or her 
mode of entry.”142 Te OICs and the changes to the IRPR should similarly be 
understood as “penalties” which violate the Refugee Convention; they efectively 
prevent claimants from accessing regular refugee claim procedures as punishment 
for violating the Quarantine Act. 
B. ARE THE MEASURES STRICTLY NECESSARY? 
Secondly, several international instruments provide guidance on when and how 
border closures should be implemented in the context of public health crises. 
As a signatory to the International Health Regulations (IHR), Canada was required 
to provide the World Health Organization (WHO) with a public health rationale 
supported by scientifc evidence before implementing measures that interfered 
with international trafc.143 Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) requires “clear and convincing evidence that the person 
whose rights are to be curtailed … poses a demonstrable threat to others; that the 
burden is proportionate to the expected beneft … and that the measure is applied 
in a non-discriminatory manner.”144 Te UNHCR reiterated these requirements, 
indicating that “measures to ascertain and manage risks to public health” must 
be “non-discriminatory as well as necessary, proportionate, and reasonable to 
the aim of protecting public health.”145 Te Canadian government has failed to 
publicly ofer a clear and consistent rationale explaining why the de facto STCA
extension is an efective means of protecting public health or that it has met the 
obligations outlined above. 
Tree days before the de facto STCA extension was implemented, Minister 
Blair indicated that asylum seekers would continue to be allowed into the country, 
but that they would be screened for symptoms and isolated for fourteen days.146 
141. B010 v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58 at para 63. 
142. James C Hathaway, Te Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) at 408. 
143. World Health Organization, International Health Regulations, 2nd (WHO, 2005), art 43.3. 
144. Mosher, supra note 116 at 932. 
145. UNHCR, COVID-19, supra note 131 at para 5. 
146. Canadian Public Afairs Channel, “Ministers and Federal Health Ofcials Provide 
COVID-19 Update” (17 March 2020) at 23m:23s, online: <www.cpac.ca/en/programs/ 
covid-19-canada-responds/episodes/66171692> [perma.cc/258L-92V9]. 















Tis initial plan would have aligned with the UNHCR’s recommendations that 
states manage the arrival of asylum-seekers in a safe manner by implementing “an 
explicit exemption for asylum seekers” where “entry bans or border closures are 
implemented,” alongside quarantine and medical screening or testing practices.147 
As discussed above, the government changed course dramatically only a 
few days later, initially banning the entry of all asylum seekers and subsequently 
carving out exceptions exclusively for STCA exempt asylum seekers. Federal 
ofcials have advanced conficting rationales for the subsequent change of policy. 
Policy documents indicate that the measures were introduced to prevent the 
entry of those who “may pose a health and safety risk to Canada.”148 Although 
Minister Blair has acknowledged that asylum seekers “do not represent a higher 
public health risk,” he has also said that the expansion is intended “to keep 
people safe”149 and to “ensure the safety of Canadians.”150 Similarly, the Prime 
Minister has stated that the changes were “not at all” due to a lack of space 
or resources,151 but Minister Blair insisted they were necessary to “manage and 
regulate non-essential passage” at the border.152 
Whatever the true rationale, the measures taken perpetuate a troubling 
history whereby refugees “have been identifed as vectors of disease, scapegoated 
… and banished.”153 As Mosher posits, the question of which laws are necessary 
in the context of a pandemic “can only be answered by interrogating more closely 
how the threat is conceptualized and who is understood to be threatened.”154 
It is clear that asylum seekers have been presented as a threat to “the health of 
Canadians,” but it is not clear why, particularly in light of evidence that migrants 
147. UNHCR Europe, supra note 8 at 1-2. 
148. Canada Gazette, 2020, supra note 103 at 555. 
149. Canadian Public Afairs Channel, “Federal Ministers and Health Ofcials Provide 
COVID-19 Update” (20 March 2020) at 1h:16m:30s, online (video): <www.cpac.ca/en/ 
programs/covid-19-canada-responds/episodes/66172917> [perma.cc/FUP4-3JKP] [CPAC, 
20 March 2020]. 
150. ParlVU, “Meeting No. 2 Special Committee on the COVID-19 Pandemic” (29 Apr 
2020) at 13h:28m, online (video): <parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/ 
PowerBrowserV2/20200429/-1/33109?Language=English&Stream=Video> [perma.cc/ 
EQ34-9DJW] [COVID-19 Committee, Meeting 2]. 
151. CPAC, 20 March 2020, supra note 149 at 00h:01m:02s. 
152. Ibid at 00h:09m:09s. 
153. Mosher, supra note 116 at 936-37. 
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and refugees have “a low risk of transmitting communicable diseases to host 
populations in general.”155 
International organizations have warned that rather than protecting public 
health, travel restrictions during pandemics can “be detrimental to disease 
prevention eforts.”156 Indeed, the WHO has written that, although “border closure 
may seem an attractive political option to prevent the spread of a communicable 
disease across international land borders, evidence that closing a border is an 
efective disease prevention measure is scant-to-nonexistent.”157 Rather than 
preventing the spread of disease, the WHO writes that border closures “can have 
the opposite efect of increasing the risk of spread by encouraging travellers to 
take uncontrolled routes across the border.”158 Te WHO accordingly encourages 
states to avoid border closures in favour of measures which “would achieve a 
similar level of health protection.”159 Similarly, the UNHCR has argued that 
precluding the admission of refugees or asylum-seekers “without evidence of 
a health risk and without measures to protect against refoulement, would be 
discriminatory and would not meet international standards.”160 
Given these warnings and the government’s failure to provide a reasonable 
or consistent rationale for targeting asylum-seekers entering between POEs, 
we believe that the de facto STCA extension is not truly about protecting the 
health and safety of Canadians. It is, instead, about the government’s desire “to 
counter charges of not protecting the population from disease.”161 
155. ParlVU, “Meeting No. 16 Special Committee on the COVID-19 Pandemic” (3 Jun 2020) at 
13h:57m, online (video): <parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/ 
20200603/-1/33341?Language=English&Stream=Video> [perma.cc/8MT6-6X9G]; Hans 
Henri P Kluge et al, “Refugee and migrant health in the COVID-19 response” (2020) 395 
Te Lancet 1237 at 1238. 
156. Ali Tejpar & Steven J Hofman, “Canada’s Violation of International Law during the 
2014-2016 Ebola Outbreak” (2016) 54 Can YB Intl Law 366 at 371. See also Sharmila 
Devi, “Travel Restrictions Hampering COVID-19 Response” (2020) 395 Te Lancet 1331. 
157. World Health Organization, Handbook for public health capacity-building at ground crossings 
and cross-border collaboration, (2020) at 28, online (pdf ): <apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/ 
handle/10665/331534/9789240000292-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/TQR5-JPH9]. 
158. Ibid. 
159. Ibid. For a detailed discussion of the ways in which “[m]any of the travel restrictions being 
implemented during the COVID-19 outbreak are not supported by science or WHO,” 
see Roojin Habibi et al, “Do not violate the International Health Regulations during the 
COVID-19 outbreak” (2020) 395 Te Lancet 664. 
160. UNHCR, COVID-19, supra note 131 at para 6. 
161. Catherine Z Worsnop, “Domestic politics and the WHO’s International Health Regulations: 
Explaining the use of trade and travel barriers during disease outbreaks” (2017) 12 Rev Intl 
Organizations 365 at 366. 











Unfortunately, prominent members of the Conservative Party have levelled 
charges focused on the supposed risks posed by asylum-seekers. For example, 
Peter MacKay criticized the Prime Minister for “allowing illegal border crossings” 
when the country may not have “enough equipment for our own citizens.”162 
Similarly, Erin O’Toole, the newly elected leader of the Conservative Party, 
argued that “the resumption of illegal passage” would be “against the health of 
the Canadian public.”163 Travel restrictions are often implemented in response to 
this type of criticism “because they can quell public fear and instill confdence in 
the government.”164 
To see that the de facto STCA extension is more about political signalling 
than public health, one needs only to consider what travel has (and has not) been 
deemed “essential” during the pandemic. For example, the Canadian government 
supported the National Hockey League’s resumption of the 2019–2020 season 
in Canadian “hub cities.”165 International travel by hockey players, coaches, and 
support staf has therefore been characterized as essential, while travelling to the 
country between POEs to seek asylum has not been. Similarly, it is unclear why 
it was deemed essential for Americans to travel to Alaska through Canada166 
while travelling to Canada to attend the birth of one’s child was not.167 Many of 
162. Emerald Bensadoun, “Coronavirus: Asylum seekers irregularly crossing to Canada will 
be screened,” Global News (17 March 2020), online: <globalnews.ca/news/6689836/ 
asylum-seekers-canada-coronavirus> [perma.cc/RQJ6-XG9A]. 
163. COVID-19 Committee, Meeting 2, supra note 150 at 13h:28m; Alex Boutilier, “Erin 
O’Toole wins Conservative Party leadership in major upset,” Toronto Star (23 August 2020), 
online: <www.thestar.com/politics/federal/2020/08/23/conservative-party-leadership-race-
live-coverage.html> [perma.cc/U3BN-VBZX]. 
164. Worsnop, supra note 161 at 366. 
165. Canadian Press, “Federal Government clears path for NHL to have hub city in 
Canada: report” CBC Sports (18 June 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/sports/hockey/nhl/ 
nhl-federal-government-canada-hub-city-1.5618558> [perma.cc/LK5G-6JC4]. See also Sean 
Rehaag, “Whose travel is ‘essential’ during coronavirus: Hockey players or asylum-seekers?” 
(17 June 2020), online: Te Conversation <theconversation.com/whose-travel-is-essential-
during-coronavirus-hockey-players-or-asylum-seekers-140239> [perma.cc/NF44-DK2W]. 
166. Joel Dryden, “Banf residents worry U.S. tourists visiting town thanks to so-called ‘Alaska 
loophole,’” CBC News (12 June 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/ 
banf-tourists-alaska-nina-stewart-michael-buxton-carr-1.5610417> [perma.cc/JV9E-P7CD]. 
167. See e.g. Janice Dickson, “U.S. man told travelling to Canada to attend son’s birth is 
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these decisions have been largely left up to border ofcials,168 and they have often 
appeared quite arbitrary.169 
Even less clear are the distinctions being made between asylum-seekers. 
Why are asylum seekers who enter Canada between ofcial POEs considered a 
public health risk while STCA exempt asylum seekers who enter at ofcial POEs 
are not? Without explanations for such distinctions, the Canadian government 
cannot reasonably argue that the present public health crisis requires them to 
direct asylum seekers entering between ofcial POEs back to the US. 
C. COULD THE MEASURES RESULT IN REFOULEMENT? 
Te question of whether returning asylum seekers to the US violates Canada’s 
non-refoulement obligation was central to the applicants’ arguments in CCR v 
Canada. Tey argued that Canada is required to “not only prevent an asylum 
seeker’s return to danger” but also to “take afrmative measures to prevent a 
risk of harm” by adopting measures that will “not result in [the asylum-seekers’] 
removal, directly or indirectly, to a place where their lives or freedom would be 
168. See Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, “Travel restriction measures: 




169. See e.g. Brigitte Bureau, “Internal documents show CBSA scenarios to decide who gets 
across the border—and who doesn’t,” CBC News (2 June 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/ 
canada/ottawa/cbsa-document-outlines-scenarios-who-crosses-border-1.5594684> [perma. 
cc/LF2Q-BRL6]. Te lack of clear guidance to the CBSA about who is considered “essential” 
has been a frequent source of conversation in the meetings of the Special Committee 
on the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, Elizabeth May called it “unacceptable” that 
CBSA agents “are exercising personal subjective judgment.” See ParlVU, “Meeting No. 
12 Special Committee on the COVID-19 Pandemic” (27 May 2020) at 13h:36m, online: 
<parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20200527/-1/33322? 
Language=English&Stream=Video> [perma.cc/2CUA-DRVV]. Similarly, Marilyn Gladu 
has highlighted “a number of inconsistencies in what is considered essential travel on 
the U.S. and in the interpretation of diferent CBSA agents,” while Paul Manly spoke 
of families stranded overseas with non-Canadian spouses “being forced to make an 
impossible decision between sheltering in place overseas or separating from their spouse 
in order to return home.” See ParlVU, “Meeting No. 3 Special Committee on the 
COVID-19 Pandemic (5 May 2020) at 12h:41m, online: <parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/ 
en/PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20200505/-1/33132?Language=English&Stream= 
Video> [perma.cc/7CJ2-Q3MZ]; ParlVU, “Meeting No. 7 Special Committee on the 
COVID-19 Pandemic” (13 May 2020) at 14h:05m, online: <parlvu.parl.gc.ca/Harmony/en/ 
PowerBrowser/PowerBrowserV2/20200513/-1/33219?Language=English&Stream=Video> 
[perma.cc/2YUD-SC4U]. 
















in danger.”170 Te Federal Court did not rule directly on whether afrmative 
measures are required to avoid “chain refoulement.”171 However, the court did 
fnd that the “‘sharing of responsibility’ objective of the STCA should entail 
some guarantee of access to a fair refugee process,” that such safeguards were 
“largely out of reach and … therefore ‘illusory’” and that, in the case of Ms. 
Mustefa, there was a “real and not speculative” risk of refoulement due to the 
applicant’s detention in the US and “the challenges in advancing an asylum claim 
for those detained.”172 
Te current emergency direct-back policy appears to provide even fewer 
guarantees that a claimant will have access to a fair refugee process. In our view, 
a consideration of American deportation practices since the global pandemic began 
requires Canadian ofcials to halt direct backs. Te Department of Homeland 
Security website states explicitly that if CBP cannot return “illegal immigrants” 
to Canada or Mexico, they “will return these aliens to their country of origin.”173 
In addition to evidence that the US has further breached its obligations under 
international law at its southern border during the pandemic,174 evidence has 
emerged that the American government “has aggressively begun to rush the 
deportations of some of the most vulnerable migrant children in its care.”175 
Tis is in addition to a presidential memo dictating that any country refusing to 
accept deportees may be penalized with visa sanctions.176 
170. CCR v Canada, Applicant’s Memo, supra note 58 at para 59. 
171. Chain refoulement has been described as “the removal of a refugee … indirectly through a 
third country.” See John Doe et al v Canada (2005), Inter-Am Comm HR, No 78/11 Annual 
Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 
69 at para 103. 
172. CCR v Canada, 2020, supra note 11 at paras 128, 130, 106. 
173. DHS, supra note 126. 
174. US Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, Press Release, “Leahy Leads Judiciary Committee 
Democrats in Demanding Answers About DHS’ Newly Claimed Authorities to Override 
Federal Laws at Southern Border” (7 April 2020), online: <www.leahy.senate.gov/press/ 
leahy-leads-judiciary-committee-democrats-in-demanding-answers_about-dhs-newly-
claimed-authorities-to-override-federal-laws-at-southern-border> [perma.cc/8WS2-6ERY]; 
Michael Garcia Bochenek, “Trump Administration Uses Pandemic as Excuse to Expel 
Migrants” (20 May 2020), online: Human Rights Watch <www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/21/ 
trump-administration-uses-pandemic-excuse-expel-migrants> [perma.cc/45P6-PYX6]. 
175. Lomi Kriel, “Te Trump Administration Is Rushing Deportations of Migrant Children 
During Coronavirus” (18 May 2020), online: Propublica <www.propublica.org/article/ 
the-trump-administration-is-rushing-deportations-of-migrant-children-during-coronavirus> 
[perma.cc/ELN8-Q6SG]. 
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Tese practices disregard the UNHCR’s warnings against restrictions on 
access to asylum which “may contribute to the further spread” of COVID-19.177 
Tere are numerous reports of deportees from the US being returned to their 
countries of origin despite testing positive for COVID-19,178 contributing to the 
rise of cases in those countries.179 Tis is especially concerning in light of reports 
about COVID-19 circulating in US detention facilities.180 
None of this evidence was before the Federal Court in CCR v Canada. 
In our view, it demonstrates that US refugee protection failures have only been 
exacerbated in the past several months. 
Canadian ofcials have indicated that they have discussed these issues with 
their American counterparts. However, other than indicating that refugee issues 
are “very important” to Canada, they have not provided any details about what 
kind of assurances they have received from the US.181 Tey have, however, 
repeatedly afrmed that “asylum seekers who try to take the Roxham path are 
re-directed to the U.S.”182 Canadian ofcials appear far more concerned with 
assuring critics that asylum-seekers are being kept out of the country than they 
are with ensuring that Canada is not complicit in chain refoulement. 
177. UNHCR, COVID-19, supra note 131 at para 9. 
178. See e.g. Arshad Mohammed, Julia Symmes Cobb & Frank Jack Daniel, “Two dozen 
people deported to Colombia on U.S. fight found to have coronavirus: sources,” Reuters 
(29 April 2020), online: <www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-colombia/ 
two-dozen-people-deported-to-colombia-on-u-s-fight-found-to-have-coronavirus-
sources-idUSKBN22B3DB> [perma.cc/8QHP-669S]; Isabel Macdonald, “US to 
deport Haitians who’ve tested positive for coronavirus: NGO” (10 May 2020), 
online: Al Jazeera <www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/deport-haitians-tested-positive-
coronavirus-ngo-200510202833575.html> [perma.cc/B8JW-EWNG]. 
179. Jonathan Blitzer, “Te Trump Administration’s Deportation Policy is Spreading the 
Coronavirus,” Te New Yorker (13 May 2020), online: <www.newyorker.com/news/daily- 
comment/the-trump-administrations-deportation-policy-is-spreading-the-coronavirus> 
[perma.cc/CJ7X-A6QD]. 
180. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
181. Canadian Public Afairs Channel, “Federal ministers and Health Ofcials Provide 
COVID-19 Update” (26 March 2020) at 13m:58s, online (video): <cpac.ca/en/programs/ 
covid-19-canada-responds/episodes/66177165> [perma.cc/5YJN-6FG5]. 
182. Canadian Public Afairs Channel, “Federal Ministers and Health Ofcials Provide 
COVID-19 Update” (22 April 2020) at 17m:37s, online (video): <www.cpac.ca/en/ 
programs/covid-19-canada-responds/episodes/66189572> [perma.cc/454D-SGPE]. 

















D. ARE THE MEASURES TAKEN NON-DISCRIMINATORY? 
Finally, the UNHCR has emphasized that all measures implemented to manage 
risks to public health must be non-discriminatory.183 Similarly, the ICCPR
requires that measures taken “not involve discrimination solely on the ground of 
… sex.”184 However, the government’s actions extend the application of a policy 
which, according to the applicants in CCR v Canada, contravenes the guarantees 
to equal protection and equal beneft of the law without discrimination under 
section 15 of the Charter.185 
Although the Federal Court declined to address these arguments because 
of its other fndings about how the STCA violates the Charter, the Court 
heard extensive evidence about how the STCA results “in a discriminatory 
distinction on the basis of sex” because female asylum seekers face barriers in 
accessing protection in the US.186 For example, the applicants in CCR v Canada
highlighted the “disproportionate efect on women of the one-year bar,”187 which 
is an American policy requiring asylum-seekers to “make their claim within one 
year of arrival in the U.S. to be eligible for asylum.”188 Te applicants presented 
evidence that women miss this deadline “at a rate 13 per cent higher than men” 
because they are “often more reluctant to disclose their experiences to anyone—let 
alone government ofcials—due to trauma, shame, and cultural norms tolerating 
gender-based persecution or that make discussing it taboo.”189 
Te applicants also highlighted barriers faced by women feeing gender-based 
persecution (GBP) “due to a restrictive interpretation of key aspects of the refugee 
defnition.”190 It is well-established in Canadian refugee law that “although gender 
is not one of the grounds specifed in the Refugee Convention, the Convention can 
be interpreted to grant protection to women who establish a well-founded fear of 
gender-based persecution” on account of their membership in a particular social 
group.191 By contrast, the applicants highlighted several ways in which “the US 
interpretation of the refugee defnition excludes protection for women feeing 
183. UNHCR, COVID-19, supra note 131 at paras 5-7. 
184. Mosher, supra note 116 at 930-31. 
185. CCR v Canada, 2020, supra note 11 at paras 151-153. 
186. CCR v Canada, Applicant’s Memo, supra note 58 at para 93. 
187. Ibid at para 95. 
188. Ibid at para 32. 
189. Ibid at para 35. 
190. Ibid at para 95. 
191. Sonia Akibo-Betts, “Te Canada-U.S. Safe Tird Country Agreement: Reinforcing Refugee 
Protection or putting Refugees at Risk” (2006) 6 J Institute Justice & Intl Studies 1 at 6. See 












   
 
MERCIER, REHAAG, THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM 735 
GBP by private actors.”192 Tey explained that by issuing a precedential decision 
in the Matter of A-B-, the American Attorney General established that “claims 
by aliens pertaining to domestic violence … will not qualify for asylum.”193 Te 
applicants argued that the Matter of A-B- makes it “nearly impossible” for asylum 
seekers feeing GBP to receive asylum in the US.194 
We agree with the applicants’ assessment. Inaddition, wenote that the situation 
facing female asylum seekers in the US has been threatened further since closing 
arguments in CCR v Canada were heard. Te Trump administration recently 
proposed amendments which would further prohibit the Secretary of Homeland 
Security from “favorably adjudicat[ing]” refugee claims founded on GBP.195 
Tese policies difer dramatically from Canadian refugee law practice. Many 
have highlighted “Canada’s international reputation for its recognition of” GBP 
claims and have argued that asylum seekers feeing GBP have good reason to 
seek asylum in Canada rather than the US.196 In our view, the de facto extension 
of the STCA amplifes the discriminatory efect which the applicants detailed in 
their submissions. 
In light of the signifcant concerns raised in CCR v Canada,we were surprised 
to learn that “[n]o gender-based analysis plus (GBA+) impacts” were identifed in 
the government’s consideration of the IRPR changes outlined above.197 We would 
be interested to know how this conclusion was reached, and feel that a more 
thorough GBA+ is warranted.198 
192. CCR v Canada, Applicant’s Memo, supra note 58 at para 38. 
193. Ibid at para 38. For a detailed discussion of this policy, see Holliday, supra note 50. 
194. CCR v Canada, Applicant’s Memo, supra note 58 at paras 40, 95. 
195. Homeland Security Department and the Executive Ofce for Immigration Review, 
“Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Fear and Reasonable Fear 
Review” (15 June 2020), online: Federal Register <www.federalregister.gov/documents/ 
2020/06/15/2020-12575/procedures-for-asylum-and-withholding-of-removal-credible-fear-
and-reasonable-fear-review> [perma.cc/HTM9-BN4X]. 
196. Sonia Akibo-Betts, “Te Canada-U.S. Safe Tird Country Agreement: Why the U.S. Is Not 
a Safe Haven for Refugee Women Asserting Gender-Based Asylum Claims” (2005) 19 
Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 105; Ibid at 111; Carasco, supra note 30 at 326-27. 
197. CCR v Canada, Applicant’s Memo, supra note 58 at para 93; Canada Gazette, 2020, supra
note 103 at 558. For a discussion of GBA+ processes, see Status of Women Canada, “What 
is GBA+ (Gender-based Analysis Plus)” (4 December 2018), online: <cfc-swc.gc.ca/gba-acs/ 
index-en.html>. 
198. If it is found that no GBA+ impacts exist, government ofcials must “demonstrate why there 
aren’t any gendered dimensions.” See Francesca Scala & Stephanie Paterson, “Gendering 
Public Policy or Rationalizing Gender? Strategic Interventions and GBA+ Practice in 
Canada” (2017) 50 Can J of Political Science 427 at 437. 












Te Canadian government’s decision to implement the de facto STCA extension 
in the name of public health was not, as is required by the ICCPR, “the least 
restrictive of the options available” to the government to combat the spread 
of COVID-19.199 Further, the Canadian government was not in a situation 
where they had “no reasonable alternatives to prevent the introduction or 
spread of” COVID-19.200 
Canada had many other reasonable policy alternatives available, such as 
including all asylum seekers amongst those travellers “with a worthy purpose” 
who are entitled to enter the country despite border closures, as Denmark 
has.201 Various screening and quarantine measures could also have been pursued. 
Instead, Canada chose emergency measures which violate obligations towards 
asylum-seekers under international law. 
We believe that the Canadian government should take steps to rectify these 
errors and to ensure that the human rights of asylum seekers are respected. 
At a minimum, Canada should immediately stop using the pandemic as a pretext 
for further closing the border to refugees.202 Not only has the STCA itself been 
held to be unconstitutional, but no convincing public health justifcation has 
been advanced for extending it even further. Te de facto extension of the STCA
appears to be nothing more than a cynical attempt to leverage a crisis to make a 
political problem go away. Te direct backs should end, and it should be made 
199. Mosher, supra note 116 at 932. 
200. Quarantine Act, supra note 99, s 58(d). 
201. European Council on Refugees and Exiles, “Information Sheet 28 May 2020: COVID-19 
Measures Related to Asylum and Migration Across Europe” (28 May 2020) at 3, online: 
<www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/COVID-INFO-28-May.pdf> [perma. 
cc/5KPR-UCZJ] [ECRE]; International Organization of Migration, Issue Brief, 
COVID-19 Identifcation and Monitoring of Emerging Immigration, Consular and Visa 
Needs (IOM, April 2020) at 2, online (pdf ): <www.iom.int/sites/default/fles/our_work/ 
DMM/IBM/2020/en/covid-19iomissuebrief-immigrationconsularandvisarecommen 
dations.pdf> [perma.cc/V89Z-2RSJ]. For details on the Portuguese response, see Mia 
Alberti & Vasco Cotovio, “Portugal give migrants and asylum-seekers full citizenship 
rights during coronavirus outbreak,” CNN (31 March 2020), online: <edition.cnn. 
com/2020/03/30/europe/portugal-migrants-citizenship-rights-coronavirus-intl/index.html>
[perma.cc/N9NG-NKBD]. 
202. We use the term “further” to recognize that the Canadian government has been involved 
in closing the border to refugees in various ways for many years. See e.g. Scott D Watson, 
Te Securitization of Humanitarian Migration : Digging Moats and Sinking Boats (Taylor & 
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clear that asylum seekers cannot be penalized for entering the country between 
POEs, as is their right under international law. 
Better yet, Canada should demonstrate leadership by insisting that crossing 
the border to seek asylum is amongst the most essential forms of international 
travel. Tis leadership is necessary now more than ever. Refugees around the 
world face heightened risks as many states limit their ability to travel to seek 
asylum in response to the global pandemic.203 Canada should be a champion for 
asylum seekers, not another country using the pandemic to erect further barriers 
to their movement. 
Tis leadership can be shown by halting plans to appeal CCR v Canada, 
by accepting the Federal Court’s fnding that the STCA is unconstitutional and 
by immediately suspending the STCA. Te US has long been unsafe for at least 
some refugees. It has become dramatically less safe under Trump’s leadership. 
American responses to the global pandemic have made things even worse. 
Te Canadian government has acknowledged that it can safely process 
refugee claims during a pandemic by processing STCA exempt asylum seekers 
without issue. As the Federal Court found, no “current justifable purpose” 
is served by treating diferently those refugee claimants who “have the beneft of 
the exemptions carved out in the STCA” and those who do not.204 If the STCA
is suspended, asylum seekers who do not meet these exemptions could enter the 
country at ofcial POEs through the same process that STCA exempt asylum 
seekers are currently safely following. Tey could be screened for the virus. Tey 
could be appropriately quarantined. 
Until Canada makes these changes, asylum seekers caught crossing between 
ofcial POEs will be directed back to a country where they face a serious risk of 
refoulement and other rights violations. Tis policy will only encourage asylum 
seekers to cross the border in places where they will not be detected and to move 
underground when they come to Canada, because incentives to engage with the 
state do “not exist where individuals enter clandestinely.”205 As a result, asylum 
seekers will not be screened for COVID-19 or quarantined upon entry. Tese 
policies do not “protect Canadians,” they endanger them. 
203. UNHCR reports that at least ninety-nine countries that have fully or partially closed their 
borders are making no exceptions for asylum seekers at all. See United Nations, “Policy 
Brief: COVID-19 and People on the Move” (5 June 2020) at 19, online (pdf ): UN <www. 
un.org/sites/un2.un.org/fles/sg_policy_brief_on_people_on_the_move.pdf> [perma.cc/ 
C4GX-V8L9]; See generally ECRE, supra note 200. 
204. CCR v Canada, 2020, supra note 11 at paras 147-48. 
205. Macklin, 2005, supra note 16 at 423. 





In the wake of the SARS epidemic, Janet Mosher highlighted that pandemics 
can present “an opportunity for us to rethink” necessary legal frameworks.206 
We urge the Canadian government to take this opportunity to suspend the STCA, 
to revoke its de facto extension and to rethink what travel is, truly, “essential.” 
206. Mosher, supra note 116 at 955. 
